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This paper argues that nominal wage inertia is a structural fea-
ture in low-in￿ation economies. Using a quarterly data set for six
G7 countries we show that, unlike price in￿ation, nominal wage in-
￿ation responds sluggishly to both monetary and technology shocks.
Accounting for this inertial behavior of nominal wages is a necessary
condition for a model to capture the business cycle properties of nom-
inal variables. We present several variants of the Calvo wage model
that are able to mimic those properties in a general equilibrium frame-
∗I am extremely grateful to Isabel Correia for her insights and guidance. I have also ben-
e￿ted from discussions with Bernardino Adªo, Carlos Robalo Marques, JosØ M. Brandªo
de Brito, Larry Christiano and seminar participants at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa.
All remaining errors are my responsibility.
￿Correspondence: Nuno Alves, Economic Research Department (DEE), Banco de Por-
tugal, R. Francisco Ribeiro, n. 2, 1150-165 Lisboa, Portugal; Tel.:351-213130936; E-mail:
njalves@bportugal.pt
1work. In contrast, models that focus on real wage rigidities or sticky
prices fail to match the data.
JEL classi￿cation: E24, E31, E32
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1 Introduction
The quest for the set of frictions that, embedded in a general equilibrium
framework, explains the dynamics of real and nominal variables in the busi-
ness cycle has always been at central stage in macroeconomics. Until recently
the prototypical sticky price model was considered the de￿nite benchmark to
study business cycles and the conduct of monetary analysis (see Woodford,
2003). However, following the seminal work of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
(2000), several contributions have argued that a simple sticky price model
does not replicate many features of the data. In parallel, other authors
showed that, on average, prices behave much more ￿exibly than usually cal-
ibrated or estimated in those models (see Bils and Klenow, 2002). This led
to a recent refocus of the literature on labor market frictions as the possible
missing link needed to explain some business cycle properties of the data.
Two major recent contributions are bound to inspire and set the pace
for future research in this area. The ￿rst is Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2004). The impressive ability of their general equilibrium model to
match the impulse responses after a monetary policy shock makes it a de￿nite
benchmark for future models to come, and has already been mimicked in
2important contributions such as Smets and Wouters (2003). A crucial feature
of their model is the presence of staggered nominal wage contracts. They
show that this labor market friction is crucial for the model to ￿t the data,
unlike the sticky-price friction. This conclusion con￿rms the results of Huang
and Liu (2002), who show that staggered wages can potentially generate more
persistence in real variables than staggered prices.
The second major result appears in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002).
These authors assess the fraction of business cycle ￿uctuations in several
countries driven by eﬃciency wedges, labor wedges and investment wedges.
They conclude that the great depressions of the US, Germany and Canada
and the 1982 US recession can be accounted for with ￿uctuations in eﬃciency
and labor wedges. The need to develop models with labor market frictions is
a direct implication of this work. This is also in line with Bordo, Erceg and
Evans (2000), who show that sticky nominal wages are crucial to understand
the US Great Depression.
Building on the above literature, the contribution of this paper is twofold.
First, we analyze labor market data in six G7 economies to uncover some
features that may be useful in the design of frictions to incorporate in general
equilibrium models. We focus on the response of in￿ation and of real and
nominal wages to monetary and technology shocks. Second, we assess some
labor market frictions that are currently embedded in macro models, in light
of the labor market evidence uncovered in the previous step of the analysis.
In this process, we present a novel extension of the usual baseline Calvo wage
model. In this extension, a fraction of the reoptimizing households updates
wages taking into account the preceding wage renegotiations.
3Our key ￿ndings are as follows. First, the data clearly point to the ex-
istence of nominal wage rigidities in the countries under study. This is par-
ticularly clear when we identify the response of real and nominal wages to
a technology shock. The contemporaneous fall in in￿ation after this shock
translates into a rise in real wages, while nominal wages stay broadly un-
changed. This result runs counter to the usual claim in the literature that
real wages are relatively rigid. We show that this real wage rigidity is not
structural. In fact, when prices change abruptly, real wages also change al-
most one for one (in the opposite direction). Similarly, when prices respond
sluggishly to some shock, real wages also behave sluggishly. This latter case
is clearly illustrated by the response of these variables to monetary policy
shocks.
Second, the signi￿cant degree of inertia in the response of nominal wage
in￿ation to both monetary and technology shocks suggests that this is a
structural feature of actual economies. In order to replicate the nominal wage
inertia and the real wage ￿exibility after a technology shock, it is necessary to
account for sources of nominal rigidity in the labor market. A straightforward
method to generate nominal wage inertia in a general equilibrium framework
is to incorporate nominal wage contracts in the set-up. We show that, in this
context, several frictions may yield analogous reduced form representations
of the wage dynamics. Therefore, from a strictly positive perspective, several
labor market frictions perform equally well in terms of the predictions of the
respective models.
Third, we conclude that models that only incorporate price stickiness
in the goods market or that focus uniquely on real wage rigidities fail to
4account for the empirical features estimated for the technology shocks in the
six economies under study. The reason for this failure lies in the inability to
endogenously generate the nominal wage inertia observed in the data.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we
document several features of the labor market in six G7 economies, in par-
ticular the response to monetary and technology shocks. Section 3 motivates
and embeds several labor market frictions in a standard general equilibrium
model. Section 4 describes and evaluates the responses of several competing
models to technology shocks. Concluding comments are presented in section
5.
2 Labor market features in six G7 countries
This section aims to uncover several features of the labor market that may be
useful to discriminate among the frictions to incorporate in general equilib-
rium models. To this end we analyze the response of several macroeconomic
variables to monetary and technology shocks in the US, Canada, France, UK,
Italy and Germany, with a special focus on labor market variables.
This section is based on a quarterly dataset constructed for the 6 coun-
tries, which is described in Appendix A. Due to data constraints, the sample
period varies between countries.
2 . 1 M o n e t a r yp o l i c ys h o c k s
The monetary policy shocks are identi￿ed as the disturbance in the follow-
ing interest rate reaction function (this follows Christiano, Eichenbaum and
5Evans, 1997):
Rt = f (Φt)+εt (1)
where Rt is the intervention rate of the central bank (or a short-term inter-
est rate) and Φt is the information set available to the central bank when
interest rate decisions are taken. The disturbance εt will be our measure of
the monetary shock. To identify εt we assume that it is orthogonal to the
elements in Φt. This corresponds to a speci￿c timing assumption imposed
in the VAR system: while the time t variables included in Φt aﬀect Rt con-
temporaneously, these variables are not contemporaneously aﬀected by the
shock εt.
We estimate VARs for the six countries in our sample. All VARs are
composed of four variables: real GDP, the in￿ation rate (measured by the
change in the GDP de￿ator), nominal wage in￿ation (measured by the change
in per-capita nominal wages) and the short-run nominal interest rate. We
assume that the time t elements of all variables are included in Φt
1.T h i s
implies that the monetary authority takes the contemporaneous information
of all variables into account when taking decisions but those decisions do not
aﬀect contemporaneously any other variable in the system.
All VARs were estimated with four lags. All variables are in levels. The
sample period varied from country to country due to data constraints and to
the exclusion of post-1998 data for euro area countries: 1959Q1-2002Q4 for
the US; 1961Q1-2002Q4 for Canada; 1978Q1-1998Q4 for France; 1962Q2-
2002Q4 for the United Kingdom; 1970Q1-1998Q4 for Italy; and 1970Q1-
1995Q4 for Germany. The solid lines in ￿gure 1 represent the impulse re-
6s p o n s e so fr e a lG D P ,p r i c ei n ￿ation, nominal wage in￿ation and the interest
rate to a positive innovation in the short-run nominal interest rate in each
country. The gray areas correspond to two standard error bands around the
impulse responses2.
After the contractionary monetary policy shock, the responses in the six
countries show some interesting patterns. First, there is a hump-shaped
response of real GDP, with the peak eﬀect occurring after about 2 years.
Second, in￿ation initially rises in four of the countries (and stays ￿at in
the remaining). Overall, it is diﬃcult to discern the evolution of in￿ation
after the shock, except for the fact that the response is quite protracted
and quantitatively small in all cases. Third, in all countries except Italy,
nominal wage in￿ation stays ￿at after the shock. Combining the nominal
wage and price in￿ation responses, we can conclude that a contractionary
m o n e t a r yp o l i c ys h o c kl e a d st oaan o n - s i g n i ￿cant response in real wages in
all countries3.
All these results are consistent with the evidence presented in Christiano
et al. (2004) and Edge, Laubach and Williams (2003) for the US, using
VARs with a much larger set of variables. This increases our con￿dence in
the results obtained for the broader set of countries.
Looking at this evidence, many researchers have tended to conclude that
real wages are rigid. This idea has recently been restated in Danthine and
Kurmann (2004), who model the process for real wages as displaying a high
degree of sluggishness. We argue that this conclusion stems from the focus
of the literature either on evidence from aggregate data or from impulse
responses to monetary policy shocks. In fact, a very diﬀerent picture emerges
7once we look at the response of labor market variables to technology shocks.
In this case, as will be shown in the next subsection, the response of real
wages is contemporaneous and sizeable.
2.2 Technology shocks
The identi￿cation of the technology shock is analogous to Gal￿ (1999) and
Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2002). Technology shocks are
de￿ned as the only source of the unit root in labor productivity4.T h eV A R s
are composed of the change in labor productivity, the in￿ation rate and the
change in real wages5.
All the VARs were estimated with four lags. The sample period varied
from country to country, as follows: 1959Q1-2002Q4 for the US; 1961Q1-
2002Q4 for Canada; 1978Q1-2002Q4 for France; 1962Q2-2002Q4 for the
United Kingdom; 1970Q1-2000Q4 for Italy; and 1970Q1-1995Q4 for Ger-
many. Figure 2 presents the response of the system to a positive technology
shock. As in the monetary shock case, several conclusions are broadly con-
sistent across countries.
First, in all cases the response of in￿ation to a technology shock is mostly
contemporaneous and the largest response typically occurs on impact. This
￿exible response of in￿ation after a technology shock is a robust pattern
in this set of countries (see Alves, 2004). Sticky prices are therefore not a
structural friction in actual economies. Second, the response of the change in
r e a lw a g e si sh i g h l ys i g n i ￿cant on impact, and mirrors the contemporaneous
response of in￿ation (with the exception of France). Third, the response of
8nominal wage in￿ation to the technology shock is contemporaneously non-
signi￿cant in all cases. In the quarters after the shock, nominal wage in￿ation
falls in a hump-shaped pattern (with the exception of Germany, where it
is always non-signi￿cant). We therefore conclude that after a technology
shock price in￿ation does not display any inertial behavior. In contrast,
nominal wage in￿ation reacts sluggishly, in line with the observed response
to monetary policy shocks.
Again, these results are perfectly consistent with the evidence from larger
VARs for the US, as in Christiano et al. (2004) and Edge et al. (2003). The
￿exibility of real wages in response to technology shocks can also be found
in Francis and Ramey (2002). These results clearly suggest that a structural
rigidity in the labor market lies not in the real wage decision but in the
nominal wage decision.
Recently there has been a growing interest in the behavior of employment
after a technology shock (see Altig et al., 2002). To analyze this issue, we
also estimated VARs with the change in the employment rate added to the
original system. The results for this variable are presented in the fourth
column of ￿gure 2. We conclude that the employment rate falls after a
positive technology shock in all countries except Germany. This conclusion
is consistent with the results presented in Gal￿ (1999), who also estimates the
VAR with the employment rate in ￿rst diﬀerences. Altig et al. (2002) argue
that the conclusions on this issue are sensitive to the variables included in
the VAR and to the degree of diﬀerencing of the data. This paper does not
attempt to contribute thoroughly to this ongoing discussion, but suggests
that a cross-country analysis may enrich the debate and bring forth more
9consistent insights. For example, the issue of overdiﬀerencing the data does
not apply to the European data since - for the available sample periods -
the employment rate is clearly a non-stationary variable in all European
countries6.
3 Embedding nominal wage stickiness in a
general equilibrium model
The evidence discussed in section 2 forcefully suggests that the main under-
lying friction in the labor market cannot be an exogenously-given constraint
on the price and/or real wage adjustment by households and ￿rms. In fact,
the evidence shows that real wages are quite ￿exible in response to technol-
ogy shocks, albeit being quite ￿at in response to monetary policy shocks.
In contrast, the response of nominal wages to both the monetary and tech-
nology shocks displays a signi￿cant degree of inertia. This suggests that
only nominal wage stickiness may apply as a structural friction in the labor
market.
In this section we embed, in turn, three types of nominal wage stickiness
in an otherwise standard general equilibrium model, which builds closely on
Christiano et al. (2004). The three labor market frictions correspond to the
standard Calvo wage model and two related variants of the model. In section
4 we compare the predictions of these models after a technology shock with
those of a standard sticky-price model and a standard fair-wage model.
The rationale for the Calvo wage model is rooted on the explicit or implicit
10long-term wage agreements that are prevalent in all industrialized countries
with low or moderate levels of in￿ation7. Despite the heterogeneity in con-
tract length, a one-year minimum threshold seems to hold in many countries
and for many historical periods8. Further, this pattern is not exclusive of
formal labor contracts. Workers not covered by terms of a collective bargain-
ing agreement also adjust wages at rather long discrete intervals, and usually
with at least one year intervals (see Taylor, 1999).
This evidence suggests that the discrete renegotiation of wages can be
proxied by an exogenous constraint facing households and ￿rms. However, it
should be stressed that for a model with nominal wage contracts to be used
sensibly as a laboratory of the economy, it is necessary that the experiments
we are subjecting our model to do not trigger signi￿cant changes in contract
duration. For example, if our aim is to analyze signi￿cant (dis)in￿ationary
experiments, assuming a constant contractual structure would obviously be
wrong.
The remainder of this subsection characterizes the behavior of the agents
in the general equilibrium model. Subsection 3.1 describes the households￿
decisions, with the exception of the wage decision. In subsection 3.2 we
present the three competing modeling strategies that take into account the
presence of nominal wage frictions in the households￿ wage decision. Subsec-
tions 3.3 to 3.5 describe the behavior of ￿rms, the ￿nancial intermediaries
and the monetary authority.
113.1 Households
There is a continuum of households, indexed by j ∈ [0,1].I nt h eb e g i n n i n go f
each period, all the money in the economy is held by the households. During
the period the jth household makes several decisions in order to maximize
utility.
First, the household decides the level of consumption. It is assumed that
there are internal habits in consumption preferences. Second, the house-
hold supplies a diﬀerentiated type of labor. Households sell their labor to a
representative ￿rm that transforms the individual diﬀerentiated labor sup-
plies into a homogeneous composite input. This composite is then demanded
by all ￿rms in the economy. Only a ￿x e df r a c t i o no fh o u s e h o l d si sa b l et o
reoptimize wages in each period.
Third, since the wage rate (and labor supply) diﬀers between households,
there is a potential for heterogeneity in their allocations. To sidestep this
issue, we follow most of the literature and assume that there are state-
contingent securities that ensure that in equilibrium households choose the
same level of consumption and asset holdings (see Erceg, Henderson and
Levin, 2000 and Christiano et al., 2004). Fourth, the household chooses the
level of cash-balances (which yield utility directly) and the level of deposits
with the ￿nancial intermediaries to hold in each period.
Technology shocks, which are assumed to be the only source of uncer-
tainty in the model, occur in the beginning of the period. Households make
all their decisions after observing these shocks. At the end of the period,
the households receive the dividends from the ￿rms, the dividends plus the
12deposits (with interest) from the ￿nancial intermediaries and the return from
the state-contingent securities.
The households maximize utility subject to an asset evolution equation.
The problem of the representative household j is the following (where the
notation re￿ects the fact that households are only heterogeneous with respect
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Pt are real cash balances, Mt is the
household￿s stock of money held at the beginning of time t, W
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arising from the participation in the state-contingent market in period t.
Consumption Ct is a composite good (with diﬀerentiated goods indexed
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where Pt(a) is the price of each type of good a in units of money.
13We assume that preferences are separable in consumption and leisure,
and have the following functional form:
u
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In each period, the household decides how much funds to hold as cash-
balances and how much to apply as deposits with the ￿nancial intermediaries.
Combining the ￿rst order conditions relative to consumption and the
















+ λt(1 − Rt)=0 (7)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the asset evolution equation. From
the ￿rst order condition with respect to consumption and (7) we obtain the
relation between uC(t) and vq(t):
vq(t)=uC(t)(Rt − 1) (8)
Equation (8) simply states that the marginal utility from holding cash bal-
ances vq(t) must equal the marginal utility from holding deposits uC(t)(Rt−
1).
143.2 The wage decision
In this subsection we present the households￿ wage decision. We start by
describing the main building blocks of the base Calvo wage model (subsub-
section 3.2.1) and then turn to two variants of that model that yield inertia
in the nominal wage in￿ation process (subsubsections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3).
3.2.1 The base Calvo wage model
In presenting the main features of the base Calvo wage model, we follow
the seminal contribution of Erceg et al. (2000). As mentioned above, the
households are monopolistic suppliers of their own diﬀerentiated labor N
j
t .
Households sell their labor to a representative and competitive ￿rm (the
aggregator) that transforms the individual diﬀerentiated labor supplies into
an homogeneous composite input, Nt.A l l ￿rms in the economy hire this
composite labor input (and by the same amount).
















The problem of the aggregator is to minimize the cost of producing a
given amount of Nt taking W
j













which represents the demand for each household￿s diﬀerentiated type of labor.
The elasticity of substitution among the diﬀerent types of labor is given by
15λw
λw−1.
















In each period only a fraction of the households (1 − ξw) is able to change
nominal wages optimally. This probability is independent of the individual
history of each household9. In the base Calvo model, the fraction ξw that
is unable to reoptimize wages keeps nominal wages constant. This nominal
wage friction captures in a precise sense the existence of ￿xed nominal wages
in the economy.
Households weight the loss and gain in utility from a change in the nom-
inal wage, given the demand for labor (10) and their budget constraint. The





















where f Wt and e Nt+i are the nominal wage and amount of labor chosen by the
h o u s e h o l di np e r i o d st and t+i respectively (the latter given the wage chosen
at t)10.
The aggregate nominal wage level is given by:
Wt =
•
(1 − ξw)f W
1
1−λw





Log-linearizing the ￿rst-order condition (12) around a zero-in￿ation steady
16state11, imposing the labor demand equation and using (13) yields the fol-
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ξw(1+β) , wt is the real wage, πt i st h er a t eo fi n ￿ation
at time t and hats represent percent deviations from the steady state. In the
base Calvo framework, the real wage is thus a function of lagged and expected
real wages, of current and expected in￿ation, and of the usual determinants
of the labor/leisure decision.
One of the features of the Calvo wage setting curve is that the house-
holds are not on their labor supply curves every period. This is due to the
nominal wage constraint. More interestingly, the aggregate wage dynam-
ics becomes almost independent from the households￿ preferences, even for
moderate degrees of contract length. In fact, for the values usually estimated
or calibrated in the literature, the size of κ -t h ec o e ﬃcient multiplying the
standard intratemporal determinants of wages in equation (14) - is minimal.
For example, in Smets and Wouters (2003) the parameters ξw and λw are,
respectively, 0.74 and 1.29 for the euro area. In Christiano et al. (2004)
the parameters ξw and λw are, respectively, 0.64 and 1.05 for the US. For
these combinations of parameters, and with β =0 .99 and χ =1 ,t h ev a l u e
of the coeﬃcient multiplying the wages￿ intratemporal determinants is al-
ways around 0.005. It can thus be concluded that the presence of nominal
wage contracts underweights considerably the relevance of the households￿ in-
17tratemporal marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
in the aggregate wage dynamics.
This feature of the model is traceable to two main factors: on the one
hand, the elasticity of substitution between labor types; on the other, the
wage contract duration. Concerning the latter, it is straightforward to note
that the higher the contract duration, the smaller the weight of each periods￿
intratemporal fundamentals to the wage decision. As for the ￿rst, it is im-
portant to note that the higher the elasticity of substitution between labor
types (i.e., the lower is λw), the higher will be the labor response to a given
change in relative wages. This relation is clear from equation (10), which
governs the labor demand faced by each household. When a shock hits the
economy, the households who are able to choose wages optimally know that
the labor demand targeted at their labor services is aﬀected by any relative
wage change. Since households have a desire to smooth labor supply over
time (governed by parameter χ), they will choose not to change wages by
much even when their frictionless intratemporal determinants change. This
explains why the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure weights modestly in the aggregate wage dynamics in a Calvo wage
model.
It is also interesting to analyze the equation for the change in nominal
wages. After simple manipulations, equation (14) can be rewritten as
∆c Wt = βEt∆c Wt+1 + κ(1 + β) •
h
−b uC,t + χ b Nt − b wt
i
(15)
Equation (15) resembles a new-Keynesian Phillips curve, as applied to
18nominal wages instead of prices. In this model nominal wage in￿ation is
a purely forward-looking variable. In fact (15) implies that nominal wage
in￿ation equals a discounted stream of current and expected future gaps
between the real wage and the households￿ average marginal rate of substi-
tution between consumption and leisure. Thus, any inertia in nominal wages
must arise from an inertial evolution of the intratemporal determinants of
real wages. In the next subsubsections we will analyze two extensions of the
Calvo wage model which embody intrinsic nominal wage in￿ation inertia.
3.2.2 The backward Calvo wage model
The ￿rst extension of the Calvo model is presented in Christiano et al. (2004),
and will be henceforth denoted "backward Calvo". The backward Calvo
model assumes that households who are not able to optimally adjust their
wages do not keep their wages ￿xed. Instead, they follow a rule of thumb
updating their wage with the previous period￿s rate of in￿ation.
The backward Calvo model yields diﬀerent dynamics in comparison to the
base Calvo model. In particular, nominal wage in￿ation in this case evolves
according to the following equation:
∆c Wt = βEt∆c Wt+1 − βb πt + b πt−1 + κ(1 + β) •
h
−b uC,t + χ b Nt − b wt
i
(16)
Two features are worth emphasizing in this equation. First, there is an
accelerationist term between previous and current in￿ation, which is absent
in the base Calvo model. Second, past in￿ation in￿uences the wage in￿ation
dynamics, which improves the ability of this model to match the nominal
19inertia that characterizes the data. However, note that this is achieved by
modeling contracts that are indexed on a quarterly basis to previous pe-
riod￿s in￿ation. It is clear that this contracting scheme is not dominant in
developed economies12. Taking seriously into account the empirics of wage
renegotiations, one would attribute a very small weight to these quarterly
wage indexation practices. The model would thus collapse into the base
Calvo model.
3.2.3 The hybrid Calvo wage model
In the second extension of the base model, that we call "hybrid Calvo", we
retain the fact that households have their nominal wages ￿xed for a number
of periods. The diﬀerence with respect to the base Calvo model lies in the
behavior of the agents who are able to change wages in each period. In
particular, we assume that a fraction (1−φ) of those agents behaves optimally
and a fraction φ merely sets the nominal wage equal to the previous average
reset wage plus in￿ation13.
Where do these non-optimal wage setters come from? They can be ratio-
nalized by observing that, in many labor markets, a fraction of ￿rms follows
t h ew a g ei n c r e a s es e ti ns p e c i ￿c ￿leading￿ sectors of the economy, such as
the public sector or important industrial ￿rms or groups of ￿rms. This type
of behavior may imply φ>0.
Aggregate nominal wage level in this set-up is given by:
Wt =
•
(1 − ξw)f W
∗ 1
1−λw





20where f W ∗
t is the average re-set wage in period t. This re-set wage is calculated
as a weighted average of the fraction (1−φ) of households who set the wage as
in the standard Calvo framework and the fraction φ that update the previous
period￿s average reset wage with lagged in￿ation.
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φ(1 − ξw + ξwξwβ)+ξw
(βξwb πt − b πt−1)
+κ
(1 − φ)ξw (1 + β)
φ(1 − ξw + ξwξwβ)+ξw
h
−b uC,t + χ b Nt − b wt
i
(18)
In this framework nominal wage in￿ation depends not only on future ex-
pected nominal wage growth and in￿ation but also on past nominal wage
growth and in￿ation. Therefore this model incorporates intrinsic wage in￿a-
tion inertia, without having to resort to nominal wage indexation as in the
"backward Calvo" case.
Naturally, the added ￿exibility arising from the possibility that φ>1
may help to ￿t this Calvo wage curve to the data. However, the relevance
of this extension can only be assessed by analyzing actual wage bargaining
practices across ￿r m sa n ds e c t o r si nd i ﬀerent countries. Merely relying on
empirical estimations of the reduced form equations may be misleading in
this respect. More microeconomic studies are therefore needed in order to
characterize the structural fundamentals of the wage bargaining relation.
213.3 Firms
Firms have access to a labor-only production technology
yt(a)=zt (Nt)
1−α (19)
where zt is an aggregate technology shock. The ￿rms hire the composite
labor at the aggregate wage rate Wt and need to borrow their wage bill from
the ￿nancial intermediaries at a rate of interest Rt.
The demand for ￿rm a￿s output is given by the households￿ problem (2)








The ￿rms choose the price to maximize pro￿ts. Since there is complete
symmetry across ￿rms, they all choose the same price. Taking into account
that the demand elasticity facing the ￿rms￿ products is  ,t h e￿rst-order













Since we will focus the analysis on the impact of aggregate technology shocks
in the economy, we have to describe the behavior of the monetary authority
in response to these shocks. We assume that the monetary authority follows
22a simple backward-looking Taylor rule, of the form
b Rt = ω0 b Rt−1 + ω1b πt−1 (22)
where the parameter ω0 captures the degree of interest rate smoothing and
ω1 measures the response of the interest rate to deviations of lagged in￿ation
from the zero in￿ation steady state level. In subsection (4.3) we will assess
the sensitivity of the results to alternative interest rate rules.
3.5 Financial intermediaries
There is complete integration of the ￿nancial markets. The ￿nancial inter-
mediaries channel the supply of loans to the respective demand. The supply
of loans corresponds to the deposits of the households with the ￿nancial in-
termediaries (Mt − Qt). The demand for loans comes from the ￿rms and
e q u a l st h ew a g eb i l l(WtNt).
3.6 Clearing conditions
In equilibrium, all markets clear. The loan market clearing condition is:
WtNt = Mt − Qt (23)
The clearing of the goods market implies that consumption of each good
a equals output:
ct(a)=yt(a) (24)
23The linearized resource constraint can be written, to a ￿rst-order approx-
imation, as follows15:
b Ct = b zt +( 1− α) b Nt (25)
4 Model responses to technology shocks
In this section we present the responses of several labor market models to a
technology shock. We will conclude that, from a positive perspective, it is
diﬃcult to discriminate between some of the Calvo-wage variants. We will
also argue that standard models with nominal price stickiness or real wage
rigidities are at odds with the data.
We start by presenting the parameterization of the various models (sub-
section 4.1). We then analyze the responses of the models to a technology
shock (subsection 4.2), with a special emphasis on the response of price in-
￿ation, nominal wage in￿ation and real wage changes. Finally, subsection
4.3 undertakes several sensitivity exercises concerning the parameterization
of the models. In particular, we will assess the sensitivity of the results to
the assumed degree of nominal wage rigidity and to the interest rate rule
followed by the monetary authority.
4.1 Parameterization
Table 1 presents the baseline calibration used in the simulations below. Most
of the values are common in the literature, and close for example to the
parameters estimated and calibrated in Christiano et al. (2004) or Smets
and Wouters (2003). Several features of this calibration can be highlighted.
24The value of β corresponds to a steady state annualized real interest rate
of 3 per cent. This value is consistent to the average real interest rate found
in the six countries under study in the post-war period. The value of the
habit persistence parameter b is comparable to the estimates of Christiano
et al. (2004) for the US and Smets and Wouters (2003) for the euro area.
The parameter χ, which determines the Frisch intertemporal labor supply
elasticity, is between χ =1assumed by Christiano et al. (2004) and χ =1 .7
estimated by Smets and Wouters (2003). We calibrate the average wage
duration to equal one year, which is consistent with the evidence reported in
section 3.1. The parameters related to the households￿ portfolio decisions (γ
and ψ) are compatible with those estimated in Christiano et al. (2004).
The ￿rms￿ average mark-up is calibrated as θ =1 .2. This is also the value
estimated by Christiano et al. (2004) and Smets and Wouters (2003). As for
t h ew a g em a r k - u p ,w ea s s u m eλw =1 .10, which is between the assumption in
Christiano et al. (2004) of λw =1 .05 and the estimate in Smets and Wouters
(2003) of λw =1 .29.
The parameters governing the response of the interest rate to a technology
shock are close to those reported in Smets and Wouters (2003) for the euro
area and Orphanides (2003) for the US. Finally, we assume that the fraction
of backward-looking wage setters in the hybrid Calvo wage model is 0.5.T h e
sensitivity of the results to this parameter is assessed in subsection 4.3.
254.2 Responses to technology shocks
Figure 3 compares the impulse responses to a positive and persistent (ρz =
0.99) technology shock in the base Calvo, the backward Calvo and the hybrid
Calvo models. The ￿gure presents the response of price in￿ation, nominal
wage in￿ation, the change in real wages, employment, consumption (which
equals output) and the interest rate.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the ￿gure. First, all the models
are able to simultaneously capture the sharp fall in in￿ation and the mirrored
rise in real wages in the period of the shock. The models also capture quite
accurately the nominal wage inertia after a technology shock.
Second, ￿gure 3 reveals that it is diﬃcult to distinguish between the
backward and the hybrid Calvo models from a strictly positive point of view.
In fact, both models seem to perform empirically well, both from a qualitative
and a quantitative point of view16. The diﬀerences between the models￿
impulse responses are actually smaller than the con￿dence intervals usually
e s t i m a t e di nt h eV A Rl i t e r a t u r e . T h i sc a nb ec o n ￿rmed by comparing the
models￿ responses with the estimated impulse responses presented in section
2. Other criteria besides the models￿ predictions seem therefore needed to
discriminate between these models. We discuss some of these criteria in the
conclusion.
Even though the above models are consistent with the evidence presented
in section 2, there are other models that fail to capture the distinct responses
of price in￿ation and wage in￿ation to a technology shock. In this sense, this
shock is an important laboratory to discriminate between several competing
26frictions in a general equilibrium framework. To assess this assertion, we
now compare the performance of the backward Calvo wage model with a
standard sticky-price model and the fair-wage model presented in Danthine
and Kurmann (2004).
The sticky price model corresponds to the model described in section 3
but without any nominal wage rigidities and with ￿rms setting prices ￿ la
















b wt + b Rt + α b Nt
·
(26)
Note that we assume that the fraction of ￿rms that does not reoptimize prices
in each quarter updates prices with lagged in￿ation, as in Christiano et al.
(2004). We calibrate this fraction to equal 0.75, which corresponds to an
average period of one year between consecutive price reoptimizations.
As for the fair-wage model, we follow the recent contributions of Collard
and de la Croix (2000) and Danthine and Kurmann (2004). In their models,
the ￿rms￿ production function embodies the work-eﬀort supplied by house-
holds. It is assumed that this eﬀort is a positive function of current and
lagged real wages and of the aggregate level of unemployment. In equilib-
rium, it can be shown17 that ￿rms choose to guarantee a constant level of
work eﬀort (as in Solow, 1979). In this case, real wages evolve as follows:
b wt = b wt−1 + ζ b Nt (27)
27We calibrate the elasticity ζ as in Danthine and Kurmann (2004), which
estimate it to equal 0.035. The unitary coeﬃcient on lagged real wages is the
preferred in Collard and de la Croix (2000). Danthine and Kurmann (2004)
estimate it to equal 0.991.
Figure 4 compares the responses of the backward Calvo model, the sticky
price model and the fair-wage model to a technology shock. Several features
are worth highlighting from the ￿gure. First, the fair-wage model does not
display any nominal wage in￿ation inertia after a technology shock. This is
due to the high degree of real wage rigidity embodied in the model. This
implies that real wages do not jump after the technology shock and that
nominal wage in￿ation follows quite closely the path of contemporaneous
price in￿ation. This stands in contrast with the evidence presented in section
2. The real wage rigidity also explains the model￿s strong propagation eﬀects
of the technology shock on employment and consumption. These propagation
eﬀects are notably highlighted in Danthine and Kurmann (2004).
Second, ￿gure 4 also con￿rms that a sticky-price model without nominal
wage frictions is not able to capture the nominal eﬀects of a technology
shock. In particular, this model fails to deliver the contemporaneous fall in
in￿ation and the nominal wage inertia after a technology shock. We therefore
conclude that an exogenous constraint on the price-setting behavior by ￿rms
is not the underlying friction driving the aggregate nominal inertia observed
in the data.
In conclusion, the nominal eﬀects of a technology shock constitute an
important information set to discriminate between models. In order to cap-
ture both the nominal wage inertia and the ￿exible in￿ation response to that
28shock, a general equilibrium model needs to incorporate sources of nominal
wage stickiness. It is clear that a model with only real wage rigidities and/or
nominal price rigidities will be at odds with the data. In contrast, models
with nominal wage rigidities easily capture the distinct responses of price
in￿ation and nominal wage in￿ation after a technology shock.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection we evaluate the impact of some of the parameters on the
results of the models. The focus here will be on the Calvo wage models.
Figure 5 presents three sensitivity exercises. In the ￿rst two columns we
assess the sensitivity of the base and backward Calvo wage models to the
degree of nominal wage rigidity (with expected contract duration varying
from 2 to 8 quarters). The third exercise assesses the sensitivity of the
hybrid Calvo model to the fraction of backward-looking optimizing agents.
The main idea stemming from ￿gure 5 is that the nominal response of the
three models to a technology shock is not aﬀected to a signi￿cant degree
in any of the cases under study. However, the response of real variables is
ampli￿ed with the degree of nominal rigidity, in particular in the backward
a n dh y b r i dC a l v om o d e l s .
In ￿gure 6 we report the sensitivity of the results to diﬀerent interest
rate rules. All the rules share the same degree of interest rate smoothing
(ω0 =0 .8)a n dt h es a m ec o e ﬃcient on the in￿ation rate (ω1 =0 .5). The
diﬀerence between the rules lies in the rate of in￿ation that the monetary
authority incorporates in the rule: in the backward rule, it is lagged in￿ation;
29in the contemporaneous rule, it is current in￿ation; in the forward rule, it
is the one-period ahead expected in￿ation. Two main conclusions may be
highlighted from ￿gure 6. The ￿rst is that the equilibrium response of real
and nominal variables to a technology shock is not invariant to the interest
rate rule followed by the monetary authority (this is also emphasised, for
example, in Gal￿, L￿pez-Salido and ValØs, 2003). For example, ￿gure 6 shows
that the response of employment to a technology shock crucially depends not
only on the underlying frictions in the nominal wage-setting process but also
on the monetary policy rule in place. The second conclusion stemming from
the ￿gure is that the main qualitative features of the response of real wages
and price and nominal wage in￿ation are preserved under all rules. The
evaluation of the models - at least when based on their predictions concerning
these variables - is therefore unchanged under the three rules.
The above exercises con￿rm the robustness of the Calvo wage models
in replicating the ￿exibility of price in￿ation and the stickiness of nominal
wages in response to a technology shock. As is clear from ￿gure 6, a further
discrimination between models may require a deeper understanding of the
response of real variables to this shock (namely the response of employment)
and a more complete knowledge of the behavior of the monetary authorities
in the sample period under study.
5C o n c l u s i o n a n d ￿nal remarks
Labor market frictions are key to understanding the general equilibrium dy-
namics of economies. In this paper we showed that the behavior of nominal
30wage in￿ation after monetary and technology shocks gives important insights
concerning the frictions needed to replicate several features of the data in a
general equilibrium framework.
We identi￿ed a substantial degree of inertia in the response of nominal
wages to both monetary and technology shocks. This contrasts with the
response of price in￿ation to those shocks. In fact, while price in￿ation
responds sluggishly to monetary policy shocks, it behaves ￿exibly in response
to technology shocks.
Models featuring only real wage rigidities or price rigidities fail to cap-
ture those patterns. This forcefully suggests that an important friction in
the labor market lies in the nominal wage decision. Incorporating nominal
wage frictions in general equilibrium models - or features that endogenously
generate nominal wage sluggishness - is therefore key to match the empirical
behavior of nominal wages.
However, there are several nominal frictions that yield analogous labor
market dynamics. From a purely positive point of view, several models (and
underlying frictions) are indistinguishable. This is the case, for example, of
a model where wages are contracted for some quarters and are continuously
indexed to past in￿ation and of a model where wages are set for some quarters
and where a fraction of the agents who is able to reoptimize wages updates
past reset wages with lagged in￿ation. Even though the ￿nal reduced form
equations of these models are close, the insights stemming from each model
are obviously diﬀerent.
To evaluate the importance of each labor market friction for modeling
purposes, the respective model￿s predictions should be just one among the
31decision criteria. Equally valuable are the correspondence of each friction
with empirical labor market evidence and the possibility of rooting them in
a microfounded model.
The ￿rst criterion requires that models explicitly take into account the
discreteness in the timing of wage renegotiations. In fact, a lower bound of
one year between wage renegotiations seems prevalent in all economies with
low to moderate rates of in￿ation. It introduces a constraint on the wage
bargaining between households and ￿rms that may aﬀect the equilibrium
of the economy. This feature of the environment is bound to be invariant
to small policy changes. For these experiments, embedding nominal wage
frictions in the model is thus not only appropriate but also desirable.
Rooting the model on labor market evidence also concerns the calibration
of the model. Simply allowing the parameters to vary in order to achieve
the best ￿t of the model may be a misleading strategy, since the resulting
parameter values may simply be incomprehensible. For models to be relevant
laboratories in the description and rationalization of economic outcomes, it
becomes crucial to anchor the calibration in as much observable features as
possible. This should be at hand in the case of wage contract duration.
The second criterion simply recalls that models which explicitly model the
agents￿ optimizing decisions are insightful for analyzing the agents￿ economic
choices, in contrast with reduced form speci￿cations, as in Taylor (1980),
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) or the fair-wage model. Adding parameters and
degrees of freedom to the models does not obviously harm their ability to ￿t
the data. However, it undermines our ability to understand it (Lucas, 1980).
This is the basis for anchoring models on solid microfoundations. Absent
32these foundations it becomes diﬃcult to rationalize and understand observed
patterns of behavior.
Further study of the characteristics of the wage bargaining process is
needed before any model can be presented as a truly structural description
of the mechanics in the labor market. Bridging the theoretical and the em-
pirical levels on these issues is a demanding task. Given the ￿exibility of
several con￿icting theoretical models, a further understanding of labor mar-
ket practices and institutions may have to be ahead of theory in the near
future.
Notes
1As shown in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), the impulse
response functions to a monetary policy shock are independent of the ordering
of the variables in Φ.
2T h e s ea r eM o n t eC a r l oB a y e s i a nc o n ￿dence intervals, computed using
random draws from the posterior distribution of the covariance matrix of
innovations and the reduced form coeﬃcient matrix.
3This was also con￿rmed by directly estimating a VAR with real wages
instead of nominal wages.
4As emphasized by Altig et al. (2002), there are other shocks that may
aﬀect labor productivity in the long-run, such as changes in capital taxes.
The arguments in this subsection do not rely on the precise origin of the
underlying shock.
5In order to use the Blanchard-Quah identi￿cation scheme, all variables
33must be in stationary form. Standard unit root tests easily reject the exis-
tence of a unit root for the variables in all countries (with the only exception
being the in￿ation rate, in particular in France).
6If, nonetheless, we compute bivariate VARs with the change in produc-
tivity and the level of the employment rate for all six countries in the sample,
the results are the following: in the US, Canada, Italy and Germany, the em-
ployment rate rises after a positive technology shock; in France and the UK,
the employment rate falls.
7This was also the rationale for the early wage contracting models of
Fisher (1977) and Taylor (1980).
8A simple survey of some studies (see, for example, Dufresne and Mer-
met, 2001 and Mermet, 2002) con￿rms this one-year representative threshold
for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, New Zealand, Norway, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and US.
9This is completely analogous to the model in Calvo (1983) but applied
to wage decisions instead of prices.
10All households that are able to reoptimize wages choose the same wage.
Therefore, f Wt and e Nt need not be indexed by j.
11This is without loss of generality. With a steady-state in￿ation π>0,
equation (14) would simply include additional terms related to the steady-
state in￿ation π.
12Italy was until recently an interesting exception in this respect. Since
1946, there was an agreement to index industry wages to the cost of living
34every quarter. This agreement was only abandoned in 1992.
13This formulation is inspired in the Hybrid Phillips curve proposed by
Gal￿ and Gertler (1999).
14A full derivation of the hybrid wage model is presented in an appendix
available upon request.
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Erceg et al. (2000) and Christiano et al. (2004), Ξt is constant to a ￿rst-
order approximation.
16In ￿gures available upon request, we also conclude that the Calvo wage
models are close from a positive point of view in the case of monetary policy
shocks. In fact, all Calvo wage models reproduce the sluggish response of
in￿ation and the small response of real wages after a monetary policy shock.
The inertial behavior of in￿ation is due to the inertia in marginal costs. The
diﬀerences in the nominal behavior between the models are rooted in the
diﬀerent labor market frictions. In fact, while the backward and hybrid Calvo
models embody intrinsic nominal wage in￿ation inertia, the base Calvo does
not. The ￿rst models are thus better able to capture the slow and gradual
response of both price and wage in￿ation to a monetary policy shock that
we observe in the data.
17A full derivation of the fair-wage model is available in an appendix avail-
able upon request.
35A Description of the data
Data for the US
The raw series used for the US were the following: non-farm business sec-
tor gdp de￿ator (source: BEA); Gross Domestic Product, in chained (1996)
dollars (source: BEA); Federal Funds rate (source: IMF); nominal wages per
hour (source: BLS); and, employment rate (source: BLS).
Data for the UK
The raw series used for the UK were the following: implied de￿ator of
Gross Value Added at basic prices (source: Oﬃce of National Statistics);
Gross Domestic Product at constant 1995 prices (source: Oﬃce of National
Statistics); overnight interbank rate, retropolated (before 1972Q1) with the
Treasury Bill rate (Source: IMF); nominal wages per worker (source: Oﬃce
of National Statistics); and, UK workforce jobs (source: Oﬃce of National
Statistics) retropolated (before 1978Q2) with series from the UK Department
of Labor.
Data for Canada
The raw series used for Canada were the following: GDP de￿ator (source:
IMF); real output at basic prices (source: OECD Quarterly National Ac-
counts); oﬃcial discount rate (source: IMF); total compensation (source:
OECD); and, civilian employment (source: OECD).
Data for Italy
The raw series used for Italy were the folowing: GDP at basic prices
de￿ator (source: Conistat); value added at basic prices (source: Conistat);
three-month money market interest rate (source: IMF); wages per person
36(source: IMF); and, civilian employment (source: OECD).
Data for France
The raw series used for France were the following: non-￿nancial enter-
prises producer prices (source: INSEE); Gross Domestic Product (source:
INSEE); call money rate (source: IMF); nominal wages per hour (source:
BLS); and, employees in market industry and services (source: OECD).
Data for Germany
The raw series used for Germany were the following: GDP de￿ator (source:
IMF); GDP volume at 1995 prices (source: IMF); call money rate (Source:
IMF); nominal hourly earnings in manufacturing (source: OECD); and, wage
and salary earners (source: Bundesbank).
References
[1] Altig, D., L. Christiano, M. Eichenbaum and J. Linde (2002). ￿Technol-
ogy Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations.￿ mimeo
[2] Alves, N. (2004). ￿A Flexible View on Prices.￿ Banco de Portugal Work-
ing Paper No. 6-04
[3] Bils, M. and P. Klenow (2002). ￿Some Evidence on the Importance of
Sticky Prices.￿ NBER working paper No. 9069
[4] Bordo, M., C. Erceg and C. Evans (2000). ￿Money, Sticky Wages and the
Great Depression.￿ American Economic Review, 90(5), pp. 1447-1463
[5] Calvo, G. (1983). ￿Staggered Prices In a Utility Maximizing Frame-
work.￿ Journal of Monetary Economics, 12(3), pp. 383-398
37[6] Chari, V., P. Kehoe and E. McGrattan (2000). ￿Sticky Price Models of
the Business Cycle.￿ Econometrica, 68, pp. 1151-1180
[7] Chari, V., P. Kehoe and E. McGrattan (2002). ￿Business Cycle Account-
ing.￿ Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Working Paper No. 625
[8] Christiano, L. (2002). ￿Solving Dynamic General Equilibrium Models
by a Method of Undetermined Coeﬃcients.￿ Computational Economics,
20(1), pp. 21-55
[9] Christiano, L., M. Eichenbaum and C. Evans (1997). ￿Sticky Price and
Limited Participation Models of Money: A Comparison.￿ European Eco-
nomic Review, 41, pp. 1201-1249
[10] Christiano, L., M. Eichenbaum and C. Evans (1998). ￿Modeling Money.￿
NBER Working Paper No. 6371
[11] Christiano, L., M. Eichenbaum and C. Evans (1999). ￿Monetary Policy
Shocks: What Have We Learned, and to What End?.￿ In Handbook of
Macroeconomics, edited by J. Taylor and M. Woodford, Amsterdam,
Elsevier Science
[12] Christiano, L., M. Eichenbaum and C. Evans (2004). ￿Nominal Rigidi-
ties and the Dynamic Eﬀects of a Shock to Monetary Policy.￿ Journal
of Political Economy.F o r t h c o m i n g
[13] Collard, F. and de la Croix, D. (2000). ￿Gift Exchange and the Business
Cycle: The Fair Wage Strikes Back.￿ Review of Economic Dynamics,
3(1), pp. 166-193
38[14] Danthine, J. and A. Kurmann (2004). ￿Fair Wages in a New Keynesian
Model of the Business Cycle.￿ Review of Economic Dynamics,7 ,1 0 7 - 1 4 2
[15] Domeij, D. and M. Floden (2003). ￿The Labor-Supply Elasticity and
Borrowing Constraints: Why Estimates are Biased.￿ previous version
as SSE/EFI Working Paper No. 480
[16] Dufresne, A. and E. Mermet (2001). ￿Trends in the Coordination of
Collective Bargaining in Europe.￿ ETUI Discussion and Working Paper
2001.01.02
[17] Edge, R., T. Laubach and J. Williams (2003). ￿The Responses of Wages
and Prices to Technology Shocks.￿ Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran-
cisco working paper 2003-21
[18] Erceg, C., D. Henderson, and A. Levin (2000). ￿Optimal Monetary Pol-
icy with Staggered Wage and Price Contracts.￿ Journal of Monetary
Economics, 46(2), pp. 281-313
[19] Fisher, S. (1977). ￿Long-term Contracts, Rational Expectations and the
Optimal Money Supply Rule.￿ Journal of Political Economy,8 5 ( 1 ) ,p p .
191-205
[20] Francis, N. and V. Ramey (2002). ￿Is the Technology-driven Real Busi-
ness Cycle Hypothesis Dead? Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations Re-
v i s i t e d . ￿N B E RW o r k i n gP a p e rN o .8 7 2 6
[21] Fuhrer, J. and G. Moore, (1995). ￿In￿ation Persistence.￿ Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 110(1), pp. 127-159
39[22] Gal￿, J. (1999). ￿Technology, Employment, and the Business Cycle: Do
Technology Shocks Explain Aggregate Fluctuations?.￿ American Eco-
nomic Review, 89(1), pp. 249-271
[23] Gal￿, J. and M. Gertler (1999). ￿In￿ation Dynamics: A Structural
Econometric Analysis.￿ Journal of Monetary Economics, 44(2), pp. 195-
222
[24] Gal￿, J., D. L￿pez-Salido and J. ValØs (2003). ￿Technology Shocks and
Monetary Policy: Assessing the Fed￿s Performance.￿ Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, 50(4), pp. 723-743
[25] Huang, K. and Z. Liu (2002). ￿Staggered Price-Setting, Staggered Wage-
Setting and Business Cycle Persistence.￿ J o u r n a lo fM o n e t a r yE c o -
nomics, 49, pp. 405-433
[26] Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (1980). ￿Methods and Problems in Business Cycle
Theory.￿ Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 12(4), pp. 696-715
[27] Mermet, E. (2002). ￿Wage Formation in Candidate Countries.￿ Euro-
pean Trade Union Confederation, mimeo
[28] Orphanides, A. (2003). ￿Historical Monetary Policy Analysis and the
Taylor Rule.￿ mimeo
[29] Solow, R. (1979). ￿Another Possible Source of Wage Stickiness.￿ Journal
of Macroeconomics, 1, pp. 79-82
40[30] Smets, F. and R. Wouters (2003). ￿Monetary Policy in an Estimated
Stochastic General Equilibrium Model for the Euro Area.￿ Journal of
the European Economic Association, 1(5), pp. 1123-1175
[31] Taylor, J. (1980). ￿Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts.￿
Journal of Political Economy, 88(1), pp. 1-23
[32] Taylor, J. (1999). ￿Staggered Price and Wage Setting in Macroeco-
nomics.￿ In Handbook of Macroeconomics, edited by J. Taylor and M.
Woodford, Amsterdam, Elsevier Science
[33] Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of
Monetary Policy, Princeton, Princeton University Press
41β 0.9926 quarterly discount rate
b 0.7 habit preferences for consumption
σ 1.5 curvature of the preferences for consumption
χ 1 curvature of the preferences for leisure
1 − α 0.64 labor share in the economy
 
 −1 1.2 ￿rm mark-up
λw 1.1 wage mark-up
γ 20 parameter from v(•) function
ψ 10−13 parameter from v(•) function
εz 0.002 size of the technology shock
ρz 0.99 persistence of the technology shock
ω0 0.8 degree of interest rate smoothing
ω1 0.5 coeﬃcient of the response of Rt to b πt−1
ξw 0.75 fraction of households who do not change wages
φ 0.5 fraction of back-looking households (in Hybrid-Calvo)
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Figure 1: Response of several variables to a contractionary monetary policy
shock.
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Figure 2: Response of several variables to a positive technology shock.
44Legend:
Deviations from unshocked path (interest rates in annualised percentage points) 
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Figure 3: Calvo models￿ responses to a positive technology shock.
45Legend:
Deviations from unshocked path (interest rates in annualised percentage points) 
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Figure 4: Comparison of responses to a positive technology shock across
alternative models.
46Legend: 
Deviations from unshocked path (interest rates in annualised percentage points) 
Base and backward Calvo models: Dashed: 2 quarters; Solid line: 4 quarters; Line with squares: 8 quarters
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Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis: varying the degree of wage frictions.
47Legend:
Deviations from unshocked path (interest rates in annualised percentage points) 
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Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis: varying the monetary policy rule.
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